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After nearly four decades of campaigning, faculty and academic staff union members across the 
University of Wisconsin (UW) System won the right to bargain collectively in June 2009 when the 
Governor signed legislation that modified state labor law.  In this paper, I present historical and 
interdisciplinary analyses of the organizational structures that were critical to the campaign‟s 
success.  While the case study should be interesting for academics across disciplines, the Wisconsin 
experience carries generalizable lessons for union organizing in any sector of the economy.  In 
addition to cataloguing the tens of legislative attempts that faculty and academic staff unionists 
undertook to win collective bargaining rights in Wisconsin, my paper juxtaposes the legislative 
goals with environmental variables such as which political party controlled state government and 
how many faculty and academic staff were committed to the campaign at any given time as regular 
dues-paying members.  It is clear in this light that persistence paid dividends for the campaign and 
that leverage created by the Local unions in relation to their state and national affiliates was 
necessary for the campaign‟s longevity and success.  Against this backdrop, I also consider the 
degree to which tensions between a Local union and its larger affiliates might variably impact union 
organizing across different international unions.  The case study has relevance for discussions of 
minority or non-majority unions as well as strategic decisions about how unions pursue level 
playing fields for organizing new members. 
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Recent and historical debates concerning changes to federal labor law illustrate the 
legislation‟s importance to national unions and business organizations.  Since federal legislation 
establishes the ground rules for organizing and for labor-management relations, it is clear that the 
stakes are high for both sides.  In fact, the high stakes that have been placed on this subject 
presumably helps to account for the failure of either side to win meaningful changes subsequent to 
1947‟s adoption of the Taft-Hartley Act (Freeman and Rogers 2006:185). 
In contrast with federal labor law, each of the 50 states have jurisdiction to establish the 
ground rules for organizing and for labor-management relations for their public sector employees 
and employers.  Because fewer people are impacted and because the employers do not have the 
same pressures to earn a profit, discussions about change to each state‟s labor laws involve lower 
stakes and, consequently, can be relatively easier to change.  One policy benefit of these differences 
is that states are able to serve as “laboratories” (Brandeis 1932) for experiments or innovations that 
people in charge of federal labor laws are unwilling or unable to test. 
 As the most recent attempt to amend federal labor law, the Employee Free Choice Act 
illustrates the challenges that advocates for national legislation can face even in cases where many 
of the Act‟s important provisions have already been adopted by several states (e.g., Bruno 2009).  
The Act also demonstrates, however, the fact that people do place varying degrees of “stakes” on 
winning changes to the law.  For example, while advocates for workplace rights agree that the Act 
would address some of the weaknesses of current labor regulations (e.g., Bronfenbrenner 2009, 
Friedman 2007, Martinez Ortega 2007), some have raised concerns that the Act might not serve all 
of the purposes that are necessary to create a level playing field for workers to organize and gain 
fair treatment (e.g., Adams 2007, Nissen 2009).  In fact, this concern about the exaggeration of 
legislative impact – at the federal or state level – is similar to the conclusion that Bronfenbrenner 
and Juravich reached in their review of public sector organizing campaigns when they 
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acknowledged that “it is not simply passage and adoption of comprehensive collective bargaining 
legislation that creates a receptive climate for organzing” (1995:122).  Instead, Bronfenbrenner and 
Juravich are clear that the relationship between laws and political strength is a two-way street when 
they specify that “the social and political climate necessary to get such legislation passed, in and of 
itself, creates an environment more conducive to organizing” (1995:122). 
 In this paper, I highlight the case of a successful long-haul campaign by faculty and 
academic staff unionists employed by the University of Wisconsin (UW) System to win collective 
bargaining enabling legislation.  While the campaign focused on winning a change to state labor 
law, there are generalizable lessons concerning the way in which the union sustained its efforts and 
maintained its energy over approximately four decades.  Beyond reviewing the chronology of 
legislative efforts since 1971, I focus on implications of the case study for (1) debates concerning 
the value of  “open source,” “minority,” or “non-majority” unions (e.g., Freeman and Rogers 2002; 
Nissen 2001; Summers 1990) in which collective bargaining is not necessarily practiced and (2) 
strategic consideration of the processes through which unions pursue neutrality agreements for 
organizing new bargaining units (e.g., Eaton and Kriesky 2001, 2009; Eaton and Rubenstein 2006; 
Hurd 2008; Lund and Wright 2003; Mills 2001; Stewart 2006).  
 
An Overview of the Wisconsin Campaign 
 
 With a history that includes figures such as “Fighting Bob” La Follette (Unger 2008) along 
with policy innovations such as unemployment insurance and workers‟ compensation (Holter 
1999:3), Wisconsin has often been recognized as “a Progressive showcase for social legislation” 
(Gilbert 2000:167).  With specific regard to its approach to labor relations, Wisconsin is broadly 
considered to have led the founding of Industrial Relations in the United States (Kaufman 2003) as 
well as the development of state labor laws.  Schneider, for example, celebrates “Wisconsin‟s 
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pioneering law” (1988:196) that was adopted in 1962 to create a labor board for the state‟s public 
sector that was empowered to administer representation elections for municipal employees and to 
otherwise resolve labor-management impasses.  Likewise, Wollett et al. (1993) establish on page 1 
of their textbook that Wisconsin had “the only state statute of significance covering public sector 
employees” in 1962.  More recently, Grodin et al. report that “Wisconsin is usually given credit… 
for being the first jurisdiction to enact legislation granting organizational, representation, and 
bargaining rights to municipal employees” (2004:81). 
 Against this backdrop and subsequent extensions of Wisconsin‟s public sector laws, it is not 
surprising that people who work for the state‟s agencies as accountants, forensic scientists, 
engineers and attorneys – to name a few professions – have formed unions that have the right and 
responsibility of bargaining collectively.  Similarly, graduate employees at UW-Madison and UW-
Milwaukee have successfully negotiated collective bargaining agreements (e.g., Czitrom 2010) just 
as faculty who work as part of the state‟s two-year technical college campuses have been bargaining 
collectively since the 1960s (Breihan 2010).   
In contrast with these groups but consistent with Lund et al.‟s (2008) observation that 
“comprehensive” public sector bargaining frameworks do not necessarily provide rights to all 
public sector employers, the largest set of employees in the state who lacked collective bargaining 
rights – until June 2009 – was the population of approximately 18,000 faculty and academic staff 
employed by the UW System‟s 15 institutions.  In the sections that follow, I will catalog the tens of 
efforts to win legislative change by drawing on a review of legislative records starting in 1971.  The 
history of those legislative efforts will be complemented, however, by a review of publications and 
related correspondence maintained by the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), the University‟s 
administration, and the state historical archives.  Finally, the review will draw partly on interviews 
and observations gleaned through my experiences as field staff assigned to the campaign by AFT‟s 
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state federation starting in 2002.  While the case study follows a model of rich ethnographic detail 
(e.g., Albright 2008; Gabriel 2008; Kamper, 2006), the paper concludes with interdisciplinary 
analyses of inter-organizational relationships (e.g., Durrenberger 2007) to highlight lessons that 
might be generalized to other environments.   
 
<insert Table 1 here> 
 
To help readers keep track, Table 1 catalogs the long list of legislative attempts – starting in 
1971 – that would have extended collective bargaining rights to faculty and academic staff 
employed by the UW System.  Table 1 also identifies which political party controlled the 
Governor‟s office, State Senate, and State Assembly across the time period according to biennial 
election cycles.  Likewise, for years where the data were available, the Table specifies the number 
of faculty and academic staff union members, the number of faculty and academic staff unionists 
elected to state federation leadership roles, the number of field staff assigned to the campaign for 
bargaining rights, and the status of positions held by student organizations, by competing labor 
organizations, and by the Faculty Senate at UW-Madison.  Throughout this paper, I will elaborate 
on the nature and importance of these variables and will present the legislative history according to 
decade since the union‟s strategic shifts tend to correspond with the ten-year windows. 
 
The 1970s: Madison’s Place in a Statewide System 
 
 Starting with the 1970s, the subject of collective bargaining rights for faculty and academic 
staff was frequently discussed; however, a more foundational policy question was also being 
answered that carried deep implications for the Union‟s campaign.  Namely, the “University of 
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Wisconsin” – with its main campus in Madison and additional campuses in Green Bay, Milwaukee, 
and Parkside – was merged with the “Wisconsin State University” system in 1971 to form a 
singular UW System.  In the wake of this merger, the new System included (1) a “flagship” research 
campus in Madison, (2) an urban doctoral campus in Milwaukee, and (3) a statewide Extension 
“campus” with offices across the state along with (4) a set of 11 comprehensive or masters-granting 
institutions (e.g., UW-Eau Claire) as well as (5) a set of more than 10 additional two-year 
campuses, which are now known as “UW Colleges.” 
 
<insert Table 2 here> 
 
 As Table 2 indicates, the UW System is very uneven when measured by the number of 
faculty and academic staff (e.g., research technicians) across campuses.  UW-Madison, for example, 
has tended to employ approximately 20 times the number of faculty as UW-Superior.  More 
systematically, Table 2 helps to illustrate that between 47% and 54% of all faculty and staff 
employed by the UW System have worked for UW-Madison over the past 40 years. 
The uniqueness of Madison in comparison with the rest of the System was always a variable 
for all parties to acknowledge during the campaign for collective bargaining rights.  Beyond being 
the largest campus with the highest paid faculty, UW-Madison has also occupied a central symbolic 
role across the state.  Newspapers, for example, regularly refer to UW-Madison as “the UW.”  
Likewise, when sports teams from the non-Madison campuses compete against Madison, it is 
routine for the opposing team to recognize Madison as “UW” or “Wisconsin.”  
 Within the union, the merger of the original UW with the Wisconsin State University system 
is important partly because the AFT initiated their attempts to organize the Madison campus before 
it merged into the institution now known as the UW System.  Consequently, AFT Local 223 was 
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chartered on October 20, 1930 (Feinsinger and Roe 1971:234) and continues through today even 
though its original jurisdiction has changed in the wake of the System‟s creation and even as a 
Local formed in 1933 for UW-Extension (Local 253) and a Local formed in 1919 for faculty in 
Milwaukee (Local 79) eventually failed to thrive (Golodner 2010).  
 Outside of internal union politics, the UW System‟s merger was also used as one of the 
Administration‟s shields against collective bargaining rights.  During a meeting of the System‟s 
Board of Regents on May 11, 1973, for example, a position paper authored by “Central and Campus 
Administrations” concluded that “our advice at this time [about the impact of bargaining rights] 
would be without the benefit of operational experience under the terms of the new merger statute.” 
 
The 1970s: TAUWF’s National Affiliation 
 
 Just as AFT Local 223 was organized in the 1930s as a union of faculty employed by the 
University in Madison, the faculty employed by the Wisconsin State University campuses started 
forming their own association beginning in 1915.  Originally called the Association of Wisconsin 
State University Faculties (AWSUF), the group changed its name to The Association of University 
of Wisconsin Faculties (TAUWF) after the systems merged.  Unlike Local 223, however, TAUWF 
and its predecessor had not been affiliated with any national or international labor union until action 
in the mid-1970s.  Presumably because of traditions that were established in advance of the 
System‟s creation, TAUWF never undertook any sustained action to organize the Madison campus 
just as Local 223, which has tended to have small but active memberships between 20 and 200, 
never pursued serious organizing of the whole UW System. 
 As reflected in Table 1, TAUWF counted nearly 2,700 faculty as members in the early 
1970s and the organization was undoubtedly very attractive for national unions to welcome.  
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Beyond its organization of thousands of faculty, the association was vibrant enough to sponsor 
several annual scholarship and business meetings that brought together faculty from campuses 
across the state for multiple days at a time.  Indeed, at one of these events in 1962, TAUWF hosted 
US Supreme Court Justice William Douglas as its keynote speaker. 
In spite of several ad hoc collaborations with the National Education Association (NEA) 
during the early 1970s, TAUWF‟s “Committee of Five” published a report in 1975 that reviewed 
the benefits and risks of proposals for affiliation that were pending with the NEA, the AFT, the 
American Association of University Professors (AAUP), and the American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME).  While it is remarkable that there were four formal 
proposals for the Committee to consider, they voted 4-1 to recommend affiliation with AFT.  
Interestingly, AFSCME was clearly the Committee‟s second preference and there was a slight edge 
for AAUP‟s proposal compared with the NEA. 
To help account for the split from NEA and the decision to choose AFT, it is worth 
highlighting the Committee‟s lists of “advantages” and “disadvantages” for affiliating with the two 
major teachers‟ organizations.  About NEA, the Committee lamented that they have “the most 
expensive dues,” “will give TAUWF only a very minor voice in state affairs,” and “made an 
indefinite financial commitment toward TAUWF affiliation.”  About AFT, the Committee‟s 
primary rationale was that AFT “has considerable financial wherewithal and a clear, definite 
commitment to provide the necessary funds to consummate affiliation and the first collective 
bargaining contract.”  It is also true that TAUWF‟s move into AFT gave it 40% of the state 
federation‟s voting strength at the time (Wisconsin Federation of Teachers, 1975) whereas they 
would have held significantly smaller stakes in any of the other national union‟s state bodies. 
 TAUWF officially affiliated as Local 3535 on January 1, 1976.  A TAUWF newsletter 
proclaiming the news quoted the Local‟s President stating: “You can be sure that TAUWF will be 
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back with its bill in the next session, and with the support of the AFT and the AFL-CIO will secure, 
at last, the means to have a positive voice for faculty in making the decisions critical to their 
professional lives” (Culver 1976).  Indeed, AFT‟s national office must have shared this level of 
confidence if only because the original affiliation agreement states that there will be significant 
quarterly grants to the Local “until the signing of the first collective bargaining agreement.”   
Part of the reason for this optimism relied on the fact that each of Wisconsin‟s neighboring 
states adopted enabling legislation for faculty and professional staff during the mid-1970s 
(NCSCBHEP 1988).  Further, as Table 1 indicates, unions expected opportunities for growth with 
Democrats in control of the state‟s legislative chambers and the Governor‟s office.  Even outside 
observers such as Milwaukee‟s largest daily newspaper published a headline in 1975 that read 
“Faculty Union at UW Appears Likely” with the first sentence specifying that “collective 
bargaining… is likely to become a reality soon in the University of Wisconsin System” (Olive 
1975). 
  
The 1970s: “WEAC Wars” 
 
 As Murphy (1992) reviews, Wisconsin was no exception to jurisdictional contests between 
the NEA and AFT for winning the right to represent teachers across the state.  In fact, AFT staff 
who worked in the state during the 1970s describe a long series of contested elections and raids 
whereby one or the other organization was seeking to win affiliation from individual bargaining 
units as the “WEAC Wars,” in reference to the NEA‟s state affiliate – the Wisconsin Education 
Association Council (WEAC). 
 In the midst of these conflicts between the AFT and NEA, the state‟s NEA affiliate – with 
support from NEA‟s national office – did not sit idly as AFT affiliates approached a victory that 
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might have positioned them well for winning as many 12,000 or more new members at the time.  
On the contrary, NEA organized varying numbers of faculty on several of the campuses (e.g., UW-
Green Bay) and presented petitions for voluntary recognition to the Board of Regents from 
majorities of the faculty at UW-Oshkosh and UW-Green Bay (Krahn 1975).  While the petitions for 
voluntary recognition were rejected, NEA attempted to “split the difference” by seeking legislation 
that would permit campus-by-campus bargaining units rather than larger multi-campus units that 
AFT endorsed.  While a campus-by-campus approach would have made it easier for NEA to 
organize some of the campuses since AFT already had a strong presence across the whole system, 
some in AFT viewed NEA‟s alternative legislation as a divisive distraction to ensure that AFT did 
not have an opportunity to multiply its size by several times.  
 Legislatively, Table 1 indicates that there were three competing versions introduced for 
collective bargaining rights during the 1977-78 session – with Democrats in control of all three 
parts of the state government (Governor, Senate, and Assembly).  Those versions were respectively 
initiated by legislators on behalf of AFT, NEA, and the Board of Regents.    
As the conflict between AFT and NEA continued and as the legislative efforts failed, each 
organization invested nontrivial amounts of energy attempting to place blame on the other.  For 
example, WEAC published multiple newsletters for distribution through its campus contacts that 
attacked TAUWF for its decision to join AFT and itemized “how „democracy‟ works in the AFT” 
with its “one man governance,” explicitly and critically referring to the AFT President Al Shanker 
(UWRFEA 1977).  Similarly, though with less animosity attacking the NEA, TAUWF charged that 
one of several reasons for the failure to win bargaining rights involved “tactics of delay and destroy 
adopted by [NEA] whose leaders in Madison clearly did not want a bill” (TAUWF 1978). 
During the same period that there were conflicts between the NEA and AFT/AFL-CIO, it is 
also noteworthy that the National Right to Work Committee, based in Arlington, Virginia published 
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an “Actiongram” to its members in the state on October 15, 1979 to attack collective bargaining 
enabling legislation as a “scheme,” “power grab,” and “take over” of “Wisconsin higher education” 
(Larson 1979). 
  
The 1980s: “Madison Liberals” 
 
 Into the 1980s, there was still optimism within the Union that enabling legislation could be 
advanced; however, direct conflicts with the NEA were overshadowed by direct conflicts with 
Madison-area legislators opposed to collective bargaining rights.  For example, during the 1981-82 
legislative session, AB 452 / SB 636 was set for consideration by the full Assembly before losing, 
49-46, on a floor vote.  The Assembly‟s Majority Leader at the time – later appointed by President 
Clinton as Ambassador to Norway – told reporters that “It cannot be proved that this bill would 
improve the quality of higher education in this state” (Fanlund 1982).   
In response to these divisions among the Democrats, the state AFL-CIO President told 
reporters that “I don‟t think we need fair-weather friends. …  If they don‟t support us at a time 
when we need them, c’est la guerre” (Shively 1982).  As part of a failed effort to win a new floor 
vote, the Wisconsin AFL-CIO (1982) also published a newsletter whose top story identified the 
“sixteen Democrats” who voted “WRONG” (original emphasis) along with the four Republicans 
and 42 Democrats who voted to extend bargaining rights. 
During the 1983-84 legislative session – with Democrats back in control of state 
government, the Senate bill (SB 174) reached a vote on the floor that lost 17-to-14 with several 
Madison-area liberals, including future three-term US Senator Russ Feingold, voting against the 
bill.  In the Assembly, there were three public hearings on the same proposal (AB 282) but no floor 
vote.   
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During the 1985-86 legislative session – with Democrats still in control of state government, 
AB 229 – with 15 amendments from the floor – passed 66-to-32 in the State Assembly and 24-to-8 
in the State Senate.  Despite this apparent passage by both legislative chambers, the legislation 
failed to receive a final procedural vote by the Assembly, which continued to be led by the 
Madison-area legislator who was later appointed as Clinton‟s Ambassador to Norway. 
With all of these close votes, it should not be surprising that there was some public 
infighting among Democratic politicians during the years when their party was in charge.  For 
example, a Democratic state representative from La Crosse publicly criticized a peer in Madison for 
advancing an “elitist” argument against enabling legislation (Pommer 1983).  Likewise, even the 
Governor Tony Earl (D) publicly chastised the UW-Madison Faculty Senate during one of their 
meetings for their “obsession” against collective bargaining rights (Knoche 1984).  In fact, Earl 
lamented that he saw “more passion, more energy” from Madison faculty opposed to collective 
bargaining rights than any other topic (e.g., increased support for public higher education).  Despite 
this heavy rhetoric and despite his personal support for enabling legislation, Earl was not known to 
have actively pressed any legislators to follow suit (Friederich 1984).  Likewise, the publicly-stated 
concerns of UW-Madison faculty members that collective bargaining rights would undermine their 
unique “flagship” status in the UW System continued to persist. 
 While AFT‟s state federation provided at least one field staff member exclusively for Locals 
3535 and 223 ever since TAUWF affiliated in 1976, Table 1 reflects the fact that AFT‟s national 
body invested at least one of their field staff members for important periods during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s when there were clear opportunities to win this significant change to state labor 
law. 
Interestingly, with the replacement of Democratic Governor Earl by Republican Tommy 
Thompson through an election in November 1986, the 1987-88 legislative session included AB 24 – 
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the 24
th
 bill introduced that session – as yet another effort to extend bargaining rights to faculty and 
academic staff employed across the UW System.  For AB 24, the legislation passed both houses of 
the Democratically-controlled legislature by margins of 66-32 in the Assembly and 23-9 in the 
Senate; however, a motion to override Governor Thompson‟s veto failed by one vote (65-34) after 
one of the initial Republican supporters switched his vote. 
 
The 1980s: Focus on Academic Staff 
 
 Conflict between the AFT and NEA took a twist during the 1980s because the NEA started 
in 1981 with legislation (AB 510 / SB 395) that would have extended collective bargaining rights to 
academic staff – and not faculty.  While the AFT eventually accepted this move during the 1990s, 
the NEA strategy was initially seen as an unacceptable and unnecessary compromise to leave 
faculty on the sidelines.   
 In 1981, for example, when AFT was still campaigning for bargaining rights for faculty and 
academic staff – with a Republican as Governor – WEAC‟s bid for legislation that would focus 
exclusively on academic staff continued the conflicts that boiled in the late 1970s.  Newspaper 
accounts of the conflict acknowledged claims that there was “an out-and-out turf battle” underway 
between AFT and NEA (Browne 1981).  In fact, TAUWF‟s director charged that WEAC‟s bill for 
academic staff was a “stalking horse to kill our bill” for academic staff and faculty (Browne 1981). 
 To take a step back, it is important to note that Table 2 demonstrates that the UW System 
employs thousands of people as “academic staff.”  In fact, Wisconsin‟s statutory definition of 
“faculty” limits the title to tenure-track positions and, consequently, part of the growth of “academic 
staff” positions is explained by its inclusion of the growing numbers of non-tenure-track faculty 
positions.   
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 While legislative efforts to gain bargaining rights for academic staff did win support in one 
house of the legislature during the 1989-90 session and won support of both legislative chambers 
during the 1991-92 biennium before being vetoed by the Governor, it is noteworthy that academic 
staff were extended statutorily-defined “shared governance” rights during the mid-1980s, 
undoubtedly in response to the pursuit of bargaining rights by the AFT and NEA. 
 Internal to the Union, it is similarly interesting that in 1987, TAUWF/Local 3535 changed 
its name to TAUWP so that “Faculty” was replaced by the more inclusive “Professionals.”  And, 
1987 is the first instance in which there is a record of AFT Local 223 using the name “United 
Faculty and Academic Staff,” after earlier merging with a previously-independent organization 
named “United Faculty” in 1974. 
 
The 1980s: Focus on Employer’s Governing Body 
 
 After Tommy Thompson‟s election as Governor, the Union continued its efforts to flip the 
Board of Regents from opponent to supporter of collective bargaining rights.  Previously, during the 
1974-75 period, for example, the Regents publicly and actively engaged the question of collective 
bargaining rights for faculty and academic staff – and even published a detailed, 54-page report on 
the subject that was later packaged as a bound volume by the Association of Governing Boards of 
Universities and Colleges.  The Regents were never, however, aligned with either AFT or NEA on 
the specifics of a mutually-agreeable framework for collective bargaining rights. 
 Throughout the 1980s, the topic again took center stage.  For example, the UW System‟s 
Board welcomed presentations in 1986 from the President of AFT‟s Local of faculty employed by 
the City University of New York as well as the Director of a national higher education labor-
management center (Muzik 1986).  Following this discussion, the Regents voted 8-6 to continue 
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opposing the right to decide; however, Local 3535‟s newsletter trumpeted that “the vote was closer 
than ever before” (Muzik 1986). 
 As regular participants in policy discussions relating to faculty and academic staff interests, 
officers of Local 3535, in particular, maintained a consistent and visible presence throughout the 
duration of this case study vis-à-vis the Board of Regents and the top-ranked officers of UW System 
Administration.  In fact, a review of Local 3535 and 223 newsletters over the past four decades 
indicates a consistent focus on operating as a public advocate for faculty and academic staff in as 
many ways as possible outside of the collective bargaining relationship.  Beyond organizing 
pressure on the Administration and Regents to seek greater public support, Locals 3535 and 223 
also maintained strong programs of representing individual faculty and academic staff in their 
appeals of unwelcome treatment.  With AFT‟s active support, Locals 3535 and 223 also invested 
significant sums into litigation that challenged discriminatory employment practices that impacted 
everyone in the potential bargaining units – not simply people who were dues-paying members. 
 
The 1990s: Plodding and Planning  
 
 Early in 1990, the campaign for bargaining rights took a novel logistical path when the 
Assembly‟s Majority Leader included a proposal for enabling legislation as part of a budget-repair 
bill (SB 542) that was adopted in the middle of a biennial budget.  While Governor Thompson 
vetoed this provision out of the budget, it opened a new avenue for winning legislative change that 
is less subject to some of the procedural wranglings that blocked previous legislative efforts. 
In 1992, in a familiar story, SB 262 was approved by both houses of the State Legislature 
but then vetoed by the Governor.  The interesting twist to this development is that Thompson 
reportedly rationalized his veto “because academic staff have „shared governance‟ rights similar to 
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faculty” (McDade 1992).  The irony of Thompson‟s position in 1992 is that academic staff had 
gained shared-governance rights as an intermediate response to earlier efforts to win enabling 
legislation; and so, it is clear that Thompson and others intended statutorily-established shared 
governance to be a compromise. 
While additional legislative efforts were initiated throughout other parts of the 1990s, the 
bills did not reach any remarkable endpoints with Republicans typically in control of most or all of 
the state‟s three wings of government.  During this time, however, Locals 3535 and 223 
collaborated with each other to develop a broader strategic approach that would engage 
constituencies (e.g., students) that had not traditionally been sought for support.  The Locals also 
prioritized agenda topics such as campaigning for a state budget that supported public higher 
education and other public goods. 
In the latter 1990s, it is noteworthy that AFT 223‟s President won election to the state 
federation‟s executive board and – because of his background as a union leader in other states – he 
posed a credible threat to the re-election of the incumbent state federation President.  
Uncoincidentally, this new internal tension between the Local and the state federation yielded a 
doubling (i.e., from one to two) of the field staff provided for organizing the UW System.  Along 
with the sizable voting bloc that Local 3535 regularly presented at state federation conventions, it is 
clear that these kinds of tensions were critical to winning renewed attention and support for the 
campaign for bargaining rights. 
Outside of the AFT, an important internal development that occurred in the 1990s is that the 
state affiliates of AFT and NEA signed an “interaction agreement” that entailed commitments to 
keep peace between the two organizations.  As part of this agreement, in fact, NEA ceded 
jurisdiction for future organizing within the UW System to the AFT amid preliminary discussions 
of a merger between the two state affiliates. 
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The 2000s: Comprehensive Campaign For Bargaining Rights 
 
Into the 2000s with Republicans still in control of most of state government, Locals 3535 
and 223 focused on winning support from Faculty Senates across the UW System and they gained 
favorable resolutions in support of collective bargaining rights from each of the campuses outside of 
Madison between March 2001 and March 2002.  Madison‟s Senate, instead, relied upon the input of 
a highly-regarded law professor who itemized seven specific concerns that she – and, later, the 
Senate – identified as necessary conditions for supporting enabling legislation. 
 It is remarkable that during the 2003-04 legislative session, there was no legislative attempt 
to win bargaining rights.  It was also the first period since the late 1970s when there was a net 
increase in the number of faculty and academic staff members of AFT across the state.  In fact, 
during this period, there were concerted efforts to draft legislation that incorporated each of the 
Madison Senate‟s concerns and there were expanded efforts on the campuses to organize faculty 
and academic staff on the basis of locally-important “issues” such as wages, health insurance 
benefits, retirement benefits, and job security, to name a few.  As an illustration of the growing 
resources that were being committed during this period, AFT‟s state federation published a series of 
news releases on topics such as salary as well as the selection of a new UW System President, the 
proposed elimination of an outreach program at UW-Platteville, a case alleging age discrimination 
at UW-Oshkosh, and AFT-sponsored litigation relating to tenure.   
 After there was time for new, Madison-acceptable legislation to be drafted and after there 
was an intentional hiatus on the legislative front, members of Locals 3535 and 223 started 
organizing on the campuses to learn more about the “past, present, and prospects” for bargaining 
rights and to build pressure on their local legislators to win support for the effort.  These efforts 
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gained a fresh focus during the 2005-06 legislation when members pressured the Republican State 
Senate Majority Leader to introduce SB 452 and testify on its behalf.  In fact, at the January 2006 
hearing for this bill, the State Senate‟s Republican Leader argued that “if we are going to bring the 
best and brightest here and keep them, they need to know that not only are the salaries good but that 
they are going to be treated thoughtfully and carefully” (Foley 2006).  At the same hearing, the 
Governor‟s Office of State Employment Relations testified in support of bargaining rights, citing 
Wisconsin‟s “fine tradition” of supporting the rights of public sector employees (Timberlake 2006).  
Additionally, the United Council of UW Students presented a copy of a resolution they adopted in 
December 2005 that supported collective bargaining rights and the UW System Administration 
formally registered a position of neutrality on the legislation.  Just as notably, the UW-Madison 
Faculty Senate did not register opposition to the legislation for the first time in history.  
 While SB 452 did not make it past a committee hearing, it provided a new legitimacy for the 
campaign partly because there were Republican legislators – responding to union-organized 
pressure from their constituents – at the front of the legislation.  The committee hearing, for 
example, attracted more than 20 members of Locals 3535 and 223 from across the state to spend a 
day in the Capitol and five members who lived in the districts of the Senate committee members 
testified.  In addition to being featured on the front page of AFT‟s statewide membership newsletter, 
the campaign also gained attention from AFT‟s national higher education periodical. 
During the 2007-08 legislative session, the Democratic Governor used the “bully pulpit” of 
the biennial state budget to include a proposal for collective bargaining rights.  And while this 
proposal was ultimately removed from the budget by legislators as a “policy item,” the proposal 
provided the Union with additional legitimacy and a new target for organizing more support.  For 
example, it was through this target that the Union gained editorial support from newspapers across 
the state including the largest daily outlet, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (2007).  While the 
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Milwaukee newspaper is not regarded as especially ideological, they opened their editorial with the 
observation that “the right to organize is a basic one that, having already been allowed even for 
police officers, cannot be reasonably denied to select other public employees in Wisconsin.”  In 
other words, the pressure campaign helped people wonder “why don‟t faculty and staff have this 
right” rather than “why should they have this right?” 
 Within months of the 2007 budget resolution that left out bargaining rights, legislation (SB 
353) was introduced that provided yet another set of opportunities for the Union to build pressure 
and expose those who were blocking the legislation‟s passage.  For example, a press conference to 
launch SB 353 was organized in December 2007 on the UW-Green Bay campus and drew 
approximately 100 people along with news reporters.  Later in December 2007, a State Senate 
Committee took testimony at a public hearing at UW-Eau Claire where 21 faculty, staff, and 
students from eight different UW campuses advocated for collective bargaining rights (Lindquist 
2007). 
 With Democrats in control of the State Senate during the 2007-08 session, SB 353 prevailed 
with bipartisan support by a margin of 21-to-12.  Despite numerous, organized efforts, however, the 
Republican-controlled State Assembly failed to provide a committee hearing let alone a floor vote 
on the legislation.  While some Democratic legislators expressed a mix of dissatisfaction and 
confusion that AFT members were working to win Republican support for collective bargaining 
rights, the Union‟s strategy was to engage members in specific areas across the state so that (a) the 
Republican legislators would have significant incentive to support enabling legislation or (b) those 
legislators who opposed this change in the state‟s labor law would be forced to register their 
opposition publicly, in advance of the November 2008 elections. 
 As indicated in Table 1, the goals of this strategy certainly match with the patterns that were 
established through the November 2008 elections since Democrats regained control of the state‟s 
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three wings of government starting in January 2009.  Of course, anyone familiar with the history 
recounted in this review knows that Democratic control did not automatically imply passage of this 
change in state law and so AFT members – as in 2007 – rallied to win action by the Governor and 
Legislature to adopt enabling legislation as part of the 2009 state budget process.  This near-term 
goal, which was based on decades of organizational focus and years of growing momentum, was 
met in June 2009 when the Governor signed a budget that included bargaining rights for 
approximately 18,000 faculty and academic staff across the UW System. 
 
A Successful, Accidental Non-Majority Union 
 
 One reason why this case is interesting is that it is clear in the case of Local 3535 – with its 
2,000 members in the early 1970s – that the national union expected to win collective bargaining 
rights within approximately one year of affiliating the independent organization.  Just as clearly, 
however, the Local remained active within the national union – without collective bargaining rights 
– for close to 35 years before this goal was reached.  The miscalculation that informed the 
affiliation – by both the Local and the national union – is interesting in light of Nissen‟s (2001) 
description of two kinds of minority unions. 
 At the origin of its affiliation, it is clear that Local 3535 was expected to be a “holding 
organization” (Nissen 2001:42) that would function as an enhanced organizing committee that 
would be able to pursue traditional representation elections within approximately one year.  
Because collective bargaining rights were not won, however, within the window that was originally 
imagined, Local 3535 – unintentionally – ended up on the “longer-term time horizon” track, 
“agitating for the workers‟ cause when no election is foreseeable in the near future” (Nissen 
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2001:42).  As for how such a “longer term” minority union persists, Nissen notes that the length of 
its existence would depend on “circumstances.” 
 Among those who have studied the experience of non-majority unions, Nack and Tarlau 
(2005) acknowledge that there are active debates within the national unions concerning whether it is 
advisable to continue investing time, energy, and resources into projects whose rewards are likely to 
be less definitive than more traditional organizing efforts.  The cases of Locals 3535 and 223, 
however, demonstrate that when minority unions are fully enfranchised members of a state and 
national union, they are capable of winning consistent levels of support from the state and national 
union.  Indeed, while Nissen also expresses concern that national or international unions be 
committed for “the long haul” (2001:50) when organizing minority unions, it is clear from the 
experiences of Local 3535 and 223 that full membership rights – in a union whose state federation 
permitted regular participation in statewide leadership roles – was a critical “circumstance” for the 
minority union‟s persistence and the successful acquisition of collective bargaining rights. 
 Another important “circumstance” that permitted Locals 3535 and 223 to succeed involves 
the fact that AFT‟s decision-making power is largely diffused through state federations.  For 
example, AFT state federations commonly serve as clearinghouses for professional staff who are 
assigned to support specific Locals.  Because of this relatively decentralized structure, members of 
Locals 3535 and 223 were able to participate in high-profile leadership roles of the state federation 
even without collective bargaining rights.  As Table 1 indicates, members of these Locals were 
consistently part of the state federation‟s executive board and two members were successively 
elected President of the state federation in 2005 and 2007, prior to the state‟s adoption of enabling 
legislation for UW System faculty and academic staff. 
 To help consider this case study in light of comparable experiences elsewhere, it is worth 
noting that the vocabulary that researchers and practitioners are using to describe organizations like 
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Locals 3535 and 223 is far from consistent.  For example, the two Locals could arguably have been 
defined as unions that were “open source” (Freeman and Rogers 2002), “minority (e.g., Nissen 
2001), “non-majority” (e.g., Summers 1990), or “nonbargaining” (McKenna 2009).  While Nack 
and Tarlau (2005) have suggested that some of these terms are unnecessary or at least overused, it is 
clear that future research should focus on systematically resolving some of this “terminological 
problem” (Mironi 2010).  It is just as clear that there is not a consistent taxonomy partly because 
“there is very little academic literature on minority unions” (Nissen 2001:36).   
 In spite of the different semantics that are used to describe unions like Locals 3535 and 223, 
advocates of non-majority unions tend to presume that (a) members will pay reduced dues and (b) 
that it costs less to support such unions.  For example, Summers assumes that “the cost of 
supporting union activities where the union lacks a majority is substantial, though less than when 
there is a an established bargaining relationship with a collective agreement and a grievance 
procedure with arbitration” (1990:547). In the same paragraph, however, Summers acknowledges 
that “there has been no effort, to my knowledge, to determine the level of dues necessary to support 
such activities by non-majority unions” (1990:547).  To apply these arguments to the Wisconsin 
case, it is notable that (a) faculty and academic staff union members were paying full dues, which 
tended to be approximately 1% of salary, and (b) the campaign still required regular – and 
sometimes heavy – subsidies from AFT‟s state federation, at least, during most of its duration.  In 
this sense, it conceivably costs more to support an active, worthwhile nonmajority union compared 
with a mature, traditional union; however, if members are fully enfranchised and paying full dues, 
then any subsidies from the state or national affiliates will need to be less than they would be 
otherwise. 
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Organizing to Organize 
 
 While the Wisconsin case presents a successful outcome of minority unionism as a path 
towards a change in labor law, union advocates in the private sector who are constrained by federal 
labor law have recently adopted the goal of winning employer-specific neutrality agreements to 
enable new organizing campaigns.  Given that workers are significantly more likely to unionize for 
collective bargaining when there are pre-existing neutrality or “card check” agreements (Eaton and 
Kriesky 2001), it makes sense to seek changes that would level the playing field before committing 
significant resources.  Indeed, a growing number of studies describe the ways in which unions for 
hotel companies (Hurd 2008), grocery distribution centers (Lund and Wright 2003), and steel 
manufacturing (Eaton and Rubenstein 2006) have sought neutrality for organizing. 
 In his review of the various ways in which unions pursue organizing with neutrality 
agreements, Hurd outlines “two broad categories of neutrality agreements: those that are the product 
of collective bargaining and those that are negotiated as stand-alone agreements with no connection 
to existing collective bargaining relationships” (2008:39).  In more detail, Hurd describes the 
approach of many unions, including the UNITE-HERE and SEIU, to win neutrality agreements 
through collective bargaining for organizing unorganized workplaces managed by the same 
employer.  Through this “bargaining to organize” (Hurd 2008:37) approach, which might include 
making participation in joint labor-management initiatives contingent on a neutrality agreement 
(Eaton and Rubenstein 2006), unions use the leverage of their current organization to level the field 
for growth.  In the other kind of campaign for neutrality agreements – where there is no pre-existing 
collective bargaining agreement, Hurd acknowledges that there are critics who charge that the 
achievement of neutrality agreements through top-down means – “typically controlled by national 
union leaders and staff” (2008:41) – can yield outcomes that conflict with effective unionism. 
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 In this context, the experiences of Locals 3535 and 223 suggest that the “playing field” – 
whether it involves an employer-specific neutrality agreement or state-specific labor law  – can also 
be modified through a third kind of approach that relies on worksite organizing that is led by people 
who are fully enfranchised as union members – and potential officers.  While there are certainly 
limitations to this “organizing to organize” approach – perhaps especially in the private sector (e.g., 
Feuille, 1991), the case study in this paper demonstrates a successful example in which the Union‟s 
internal political structure lent itself to this outcome.  More specifically, rather than rely on the 
discretion of decision makers within the Union – but outside of the potential bargaining unit, it was 
active and energetic leveraging by the Locals within the state federation, primarily, that kept the 




The case study of this long-haul campaign by faculty and academic staff members across the 
UW System is interesting in light of growing momentum on colleges and universities for 
unionization by tenure-track faculty (Holsinger 2008), non-tenure-track faculty (Dobbie and 
Robinson 2008), graduate employees (Herman and Schmid 2003; Lafer 2003), and classified staff 
(Albright 2008).  Indeed, the relevance of unionization has become a mainstream point of analysis 
for any consideration of how contemporary colleges and universities are governed (e.g., Ehrenberg 
et al. 2004), as evidenced partly by The Wall Street Journal‟s (2009) decision to editorialize in 
protest of Wisconsin‟s adoption of enabling legislation for faculty and academic staff.  The case 
study presented in this paper is also helpful, however, for the generalizable lessons and real-world 
data that it provides, especially given the relative lack of attention that minority unions have 
received to date. 
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 Among the generalizable lessons, it is clear that two necessary components of the campaign 
for bargaining rights in Wisconsin were: (1) the full enfranchisement of members through Locals 
3535 and 223 and (2) the relatively diffuse distribution of internal governance within the national 
union.  In either case, it is clear that if faculty and academic staff members did not have the leverage 
that they were able to exercise through internal AFT governance channels, then the campaign for 
bargaining rights would have easily been replaced by other organizational goals.  Likewise, if the 
AFT state federation did not have the ability to assign significant staffing resources to the two 
Locals and, instead, the decisions were left in the hands of regional or national governing bodies, 
then the two Locals would have held no leverage to extract significant and sustained commitments. 
 Two implications of the case study relate to (1) the importance of non-majority unions and 
(2) the ways in which unions seek to level the playing field for organizing new members.  In this 
context, it is interesting that Locals 3535 and 223 successfully led the campaign for bargaining 
rights by “returning to [the] roots” (Morris 2004:11) of organizing a workplace independent of any 
near-term prospect for exclusive representation through collective bargaining.  Indeed, while it was 
routine for international Unions to charter Locals during the 1930s, for example, that had no 
immediate chance of proceeding to a representation election (e.g., Kugler 1968), that practice does 
not presently prevail as the dominant model for organizing.  While there are certainly limitations to 
the applicability of this case study as a model (e.g., within international unions where power is not 
broadly diffused), the case should help to provoke more consideration of this kind of approach to 
organizing new workplaces.  In fact, the case provides a result for the kind of experimentation with 
minority unions that Hurd and Pinnock predicted might have some of “greatest potential for 
creativity” (2004:213) and Chaison (2006:425) outlined as part of the “path to revival.” 
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Table 1 
 
Listing of attempts to extend collective bargaining rights to University of Wisconsin faculty and 





























































































































































1971-72 AB 1319 D R D 2700 1 1 Oppose  O No No 
1973-74 AJR 54 D R D ↓ 1 1   O N N 
 AB 825          O N N 
 AB 828          O N N 
1975-76 AB 511  D D D ↓ 1 1 O  O N N 
 AB 900        Support  O N N 
1977-78 SB 289 D D D ↑ 2 1 O S O N N 
 SB 335       S  O N N 
 SB 363          O N N 
1979-80 SB 121  R D D 1785 3 2 O O O N N 
1981-82 AB 510 / SB 395 R D D ↓ 2 2 O  O N N 
 AB 452 / SB 636         O N N 
1983-84 SB 174 / AB 282 D D D ↓ 1 2 O  O N N 
1985-86 SB 170 D D D 1457 2 2 O  O N N 
 AB 229         O N N 
 AB 179 / SB 115         O N N 
1987-88 SB 25 R D D ↓ 2 2 O O O N N 
 AB 24         O N N 
1989-90 SB 311 R D D ↓ 1 1 O S O Yes N 
 SB 542 R D D   1   O Y N 
1991-92 SB 262 R D D ↓ 1 1   O Y N 
 SB 425         O Y N 
1993-94 AB 829 R D / R* D 1000 1 1   O Y N 
 AB 933     1 1 O  O Y N 
1995-96 AB 925 R R / D* R ↓ 1 1   O Y N 
1997-98 SB 14 R D / R* R ↓ 1 1 O  O Y N 
1999-2000 SB 132 R D R ↓ 2 2 O  O Y N 
2001-02 SB 145 R D R ↓ 2 2 O S Neutral Y N 
2003-04  D R R ↑ 2 2   N Y N 
2005-06 SB 452 D R R ↔ 3** 3+ Neutral S N Y N 
2007 State Budget D D R ↔ 3** 3+ N S N Y Yes 
2007-08 SB 353 D D R ↔ 2** 3+ N S N Y Y 
2009 State Budget D D D ↔ 2** 3+ N S N Y Y 
             
* Leadership switched mid-session because of special elections. 
** Officers included AFT State Federation President. 
Sources: State of Wisconsin Blue Book, Legislative Records, AFT records 
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Table 2 
 
Longitudinal record of number of faculty and academic staff positions within the University of 
Wisconsin System, by campus and job category. 
 
Full-time Equivalent (FTE) 1978-       
TOTAL # of Faculty FTE 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2008* 
Eau Claire 471 377 480 490 442 426 406 
Green Bay 157 163 161 169 170 166 170 
La Crosse 294 309 375 350 342 329 322 
Madison 2150 2059 2325 2347 2108 2168 2124 
Milwaukee 849 841 899 892 754 816 827 
Oshkosh 500 428 450 410 386 374 406 
Parkside 164 163 155 150 144 138 131 
Platteville 238 225 257 240 228 227 249 
River Falls 243 250 272 263 254 234 237 
Stevens Point 425 388 396 388 349 368 354 
Stout 308 312 323 319 308 287 297 
Superior 144 108 111 107 107 107 114 
Whitewater 382 381 408 396 362 348 352 
Colleges 347 345 356 354 345 352 293 
Extension 580 486 228 293 304 287 277 
Faculty totals 7252 6835 7196 7168 6603 6627 6559 
        
 1978-       
TOTAL # of Academic Staff FTE 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2008 
Eau Claire 153 303 220 203 236 250 276 
Green Bay 117 134 162 178 189 204 186 
La Crosse 169 194 195 232 262 293 296 
Madison 3010 3815 4916 5470 5566 6578 7234 
Milwaukee 596 547 704 717 865 1064 1150 
Oshkosh 119 194 225 280 357 355 410 
Parkside 114 137 152 161 139 175 192 
Platteville 72 115 111 146 153 178 210 
River Falls 70 97 111 126 128 140 141 
Stevens Point 108 189 222 237 255 274 316 
Stout 161 196 241 258 244 251 298 
Superior 41 96 98 127 101 116 119 
Whitewater 123 168 229 236 273 308 297 
Colleges 146 182 188 210 215 253 292 
Extension 363 459 339 386 493 568 560 
Academic Staff totals 5362 6826 8113 8967 9476 11007 11977 
 
Source: UW System Fact Book (annual publication) 
* Data for 2008-09 have not yet been published. 
 
 
 
